Efficient Penalty Causes with Debiasing:  Lessons from Cognitive Psychology by Baffi, Enrico
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 47 
Number 4 Summer 2013 pp.111-135 
Summer 2013 
Efficient Penalty Causes with Debiasing: Lessons from Cognitive 
Psychology 
Enrico Baffi 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Enrico Baffi, Efficient Penalty Causes with Debiasing: Lessons from Cognitive Psychology, 47 Val. U. L. 
Rev. 111 (2013). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss4/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University 
Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
 993
EFFICIENT PENALTY CLAUSES WITH 
DEBIASING:  LESSONS FROM COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOLOGY 
Enrico Baffi* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The rules that apply to liquidated damages partially diverge 
between the common law and civil law tradition.1  In the United States, a 
distinction arises between a “proper” liquidated damages clause and a 
penalty clause.2  A provision determining the amount of damages that 
must be awarded in the event of breach is considered a “liquidated 
damages provision” and is enforceable under two conditions: (1) the 
actual damages at the time of contracting were difficult to estimate; and 
(2) the amount fixed in the provision is a reasonable estimate of the 
actual loss.3  When these two conditions do not hold, the clause is 
considered a penalty clause and is void.  Richard Posner has described 
this distinction as “a major unexplained puzzle in the economic theory of 
the common law.”4  Scholars who make use of rational choice theory find 
this doctrine inefficient and unjustified, although their position is 
warranted because of their respect for the common law efficiency 
hypothesis.5 
This common law treatment of penalty clauses reveals that U.S. 
courts do not fully share the idea that humans are perfectly rational 
decision makers.  Indeed, U.S. courts justify the invalidation of penalty 
clauses by referring to the “illusions of hope,”6 i.e., the confidence that 
nothing will go wrong.  Courts consequently assume that due to their 
                                                 
* Professor of law and economics at Università Telematica Guglielmo Marconi. 
1 Catherine A. Rogers, Gulliver’s Troubled Travels, or the Conundrum of Comparative Law, 
67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 149, 169–70 (1998). 
2 Roy Ryden Anderson, Liquidated Damages Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 SW. 
L.J. 1083, 1090 (1988). 
3 Id. 
4 Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 
290 (1979);  see also Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and 
the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient 
Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977).  The most comprehensive survey on liquidated 
damages provisions theories is by Gerrit De Geest.  Gerrit De Geest & Filip Wuyts, Penalty 
Clause and Liquidated Damages, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 141 (Boudewijn 
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). 
5 See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 
225 (1979) (discussing elements of the rational choice theory with respect to efficiency). 
6 Jeffrey B. Coopersmith, Comment, Refocusing Liquidated Damages Law for Real Estate 
Contracts:  Returning to the Historical Roots of the Penalty Doctrine, 39 EMORY L. J. 267, 268 
(1990). 
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optimism, parties “fail to bargain adequately over remedial provisions.”7  
In cognitive psychology terminology, this “unrealistic optimism” is 
referred to by courts as “overoptimism,” “overconfidence,” or “the 
illusion of control.”  The reasonableness evaluation of liquidated 
damages is normally carried out from an ex ante point of view,8 but in 
some cases courts have preferred a so-called “second-look standard,” 
that is, a comparison between the predetermined damages and actual 
damages.9  In the United States, this tendency has been approved by 
some influential scholars.10  In civil law countries there has been no such 
strong opposition to penalty clauses; general civil law systems follow an 
intermediate approach, as exemplified by the Italian Civil Code of 1942, 
which states in Article 1382 that “the penalty may be reduced if . . . its 
amount is manifestly too high.”11 
II.  HYPOTHESES CONSIDERED 
In this work, we shall review damages provisions that would be 
considered penalty clauses according to U.S. common law (i.e., because 
they are not a reasonable estimate of damages) and should be reduced, 
according to civil codes, as disproportionately high.  The aim of this 
Article is to use cognitive psychology to identify cases in which penalty 
clauses should be considered enforceable in the presence of the 
previously described conditions.  This should allow for the evaluation 
and scrutiny of the liquidated damages provision in both common law 
and civil law jurisdictions.  Prominent scholars have previously 
                                                 
7 Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis:  The Case of 
Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717, 727 (2000). 
8 See, e.g., Hutchison v. Tompkins, 259 So.2d 129, 131–32 (Fla. 1972) (explaining that in 
evaluating liquidated damages clauses, courts usually consider the circumstances leading 
up to the drafting of the liquidated damages clause). 
9 This expression is used by Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the 
Limits of Contracts, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 234–35 (1995). 
10 Id. at 235 & nn.119 & 120. 
11 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 1384 (It.), translated in Italian Codice Civile, TRANS-LEX.ORG, 
http://www.trans-lex.org/601300 (last visited June 29, 2013) (translated by author).  There 
are however several differences among civil law systems.  For example, in Germany and 
only in Germany there is a distinction for merchants’ discipline as opposed to one for non-
merchants.  In Germany, the distinction is drawn between the civil code and the 
commercial code.  Whereas the latter considers enforceable penalty clauses, BGB section 
343 states, “If a payable penalty is disproportionately high, it may on the application of the 
obligor be reduced to a reasonable amount by judicial decision.”  Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
[BGB] [Civil Code], Jan. 2, 2002, Reichsgesetzbuch [RGBl] at 64, as amended § 343, ¶ 1, 
sentence 1 (Ger.).  See generally Ugo Mattei, The Comparative Law and Economics of Penalty 
Clauses in Contracts, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 427 (1995) (relaying the general situation in 
Continental Europe). 
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addressed this issue through the lens of cognitive psychology,12 but I 
hope to shed some new light on this issue within the framework of 
analysis of this discipline. 
As a benchmark case, we will consider whether (and why) two 
perfectly competent parties would introduce a liquidated damages 
provision that is not a reasonable estimate of expected damages.  
Influential scholars have reached different conclusions on this very 
question.  Samuel Rea and Alan Schwartz suggested that a supra-
compensatory damage provision is inefficient,13 while Anthony 
Kronman and especially Richard Posner have espoused the opposite 
claim.14  According to Rea, “There are no strong economic arguments for 
enforcing damages that are unreasonably large ex ante, and the doctrine 
can be justified as a method of identifying cases of mistake or 
unconscionability.”15  In the language of the unconscionability doctrine, 
substantive unconscionability is evidence of procedural 
unconscionality.16  To the contrary, Posner affirms the idea that penalty 
clauses can be useful as a signal for a promisor’s reliability.  According to 
Posner, this signaling function is important especially for new entrants in 
the market who have not yet built up a reputation. An effective way for a 
promisor to convince other parties that he will perform as promised is to 
offer a penalty clause against himself. The fact that the promisor is 
willing to offer such a heavy sanction on his non-performance is a signal 
that he is convinced that he is willing and able to perform. Thus a 
penalty clause has a communicative function: it is a signal of reliability 
sent by the party to the contract who does not have a clear positive 
reputation in the market because he is a new entrant.17 
                                                 
12 See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:  
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000). 
13 Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated Damages, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 147, 148 (1984); Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory 
Remedies:  An Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 YALE L. J. 369, 369–70 (1991). 
14 Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 370 (1978); Posner, 
supra note 4, at 290. 
15 Rea, supra note 13, at 167.  Rea’s idea is that a supra-compensatory provision is a 
form of gambling that is not desirable for parties who are risk-averse.  The premium 
requested by one party exceeds the benefit obtained by the other party.  Id. 
16 Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related 
Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV 1, 17–20 (1993) (illustrating the intersection where substantive 
unconcionability and procedural unconscionability meet). 
17 RICHARD POSNER,  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 142 (5th ed., 1998). 
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III.  COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, PENALTY CLAUSES, AND THE ROLE OF THE 
COURTS 
Cognitive psychology refutes the idea of the rational human decision 
maker.18  Decision makers use heuristics and often commit systematic 
mistakes.19  “Bias” is the term used to indicate the observed behavioral 
gap between the rational human choice and the real-life individual 
observed in the experiments.20  The ideal competence that Posner 
attributes to the decision maker is at odds with the findings of cognitive 
psychology.  At first glance, cognitive psychology should offer 
arguments for those who approve the penalty doctrine; however, if we 
consider that one of the most important biases that has been singled out, 
overoptimism, seems to be the scientific elaboration of the illusion of 
hope idea, it is apparent that this has been used by some courts to justify 
the penalty doctrine.21 
However, some problems immediately arise.  First of all, scholars 
who suppose that judges can establish whether the ex ante evaluation of 
damages was reasonable probably consider this task too easy.  Here, as 
Hillman suggests, cognitive psychology offers some arguments to those 
who are skeptical about the capabilities of judges to elaborate on this 
judgment.22  Hindsight bias, another systematic deviation from rational 
behavior, can also be a problem for judges.  This bias consists of the 
assumption that people overstate the “predictability of events.”23  Once 
                                                 
18 See Nancy Levit, Confronting Conventional Thinking:  The Heuristics Problem in Feminist 
Legal Theory, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 391, 406 (2006) (“[Cognitive psychology] means that 
people will make decisions that are not consistently ‘rational’ in the logical-evidentiary 
sense—decisions that, in the words of law and economics, ‘fail to maximize their expected 
utility.’”) (footnote omitted). 
19 See Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance:  A Theory of Values and 
Cognitive Style, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 642, 670 (2004) (“Research in another field of psychology, 
judgment and decision making, may be helpful in identifying the factors that influence this 
variation.  The pivotal observation here is that cognitive processes are taxing for 
individuals.  This is strongly evidenced by the phenomnon of cognitive heuristics, which 
allow for fast and frugal reasoning albeit at the price of systematic errors.”) (footnote 
omitted); see also Sarah Thimsen, Brian H. Bornstein & Monica K. Miller, The Dynamite 
Charge:  Too Explosive for Its Own Good?, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 93, 114–118 (2009) (analyzing the 
implementation of heuristics by jurors and the dangers presented). 
20 See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the 
Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1043–44 (2009) (“[Heuristics and Biases] are simply 
ways of thinking and deciding that appear in laboratory experiments and field studies with 
statistically significant frequency.”). 
21 See Hillman, supra note 7, at 728 (explaining that the optimism of performance taints 
the parties’ evaulation of whether to include a liquid damages provision). 
22 Id. at 728–29. 
23 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 571, 571 (1998). 
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people know that an event has happened, “they believe it was more 
likely to occur than before they received the information.”24 
Judges can also exhibit hindsight bias and overestimate a party’s 
ability to calculate, when they have stipulated the contract, the damage 
that could result from a breach.25  If, for example, there were a one 
percent possibility that substantial damage would occur in the case of 
breach and then that event actually occured, the hindsight bias could 
lead the judge to think that there was a twenty percent chance.  In this 
way cognitive psychology can offer arguments to sustain the opinion of 
the difficulty of a judgment about the ex ante reasonableness of 
damages, supporting the idea that liquidated damages provisions should 
not be subjected to rigid scrutiny.26 
Second, judges’ sense of fairness may cause them to void a damages 
provision simply because actual damages turn out to be inconsistent 
with the agreed upon damages—a tendency that has already emerged in 
some Anglo-American decisions.  Finally, cognitive psychology can 
invite legislators to be cautious about judges’ ability to evaluate damages 
clauses because of the presence of the “framing effect.”27  The “framing 
effect” is a bias consisting of systematic reversals of preferences when 
the same problem is presented in different ways.28   In the context of the 
damages provision, the framing effect can be quite evident; indeed, 
parties can frame a penalty clause in such a way that judges evaluate it 
as such.  Parties can frame their agreed damages clause so that a judge is 
unlikely to call it a penalty.  For example, a seller can essentially achieve 
the same result by either offering a discount for early payment or a 
penalty for late payment.  “The ease with which parties can manipulate 
their agreed remedies provision suggests that the dichotomy between 
penalties and liquidated damages lacks substance, and simply results 
from a framing bias of judges.”29 
As far as cognitive deficiencies that can influence judges are 
concerned, Jeffrey Rachlinski has observed, “[C]ourts might already 
have reduced the effect of hindsight bias . . . by identifying 
                                                 
24 Hillman, supra note 7, at 723. 
25 Id. at 732; see also Larry T. Garvin, Disproportionality and the Law of Consequential 
Damages:  Default Theory and Cognitive Reality, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 339, 389 & n.220 (1998) 
(discussing other biases in addition to hindsight bias). 
26 See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalites and the Just 
Compensation Principle:  Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 
77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977) (setting forth many arguments against penalty doctrine and 
in favor of freedom of contract in the logic of the neoclassical Rational Choice Theory). 
27 Hillman, supra note 7, at 736. 
28 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 
59 J. BUS. 251, 257 (1986) (explaining the framing effect generally). 
29 Hillman, supra note 7, at 733. 
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circumstances in which actual damages are considered per se 
unpredictable.”30  Rachlinski’s idea is that judges’ biases can be corrected 
in the same way as biases of every person can be eliminated.31  It is 
merely a problem of building a system of rules that work in that 
direction.32 
IV.  THE FIELD OF BIASES:  OVEROPTIMISM, OVERCONFIDENCE, AND THE 
ILLUSION OF CONTROL 
Arguments have been extrapolated from cognitive psychology that 
suggest the inefficiency of the penalty doctrine because of biases that can 
affect the courts.  However, cognitive psychology, given its nature as a 
discipline that denies individual rationality, is usually a fertile ground 
for proponents of a more stringent control of contracts—in other words, 
for a wider legal paternalism.  For purposes of this topic, three biases 
shed light on our discussion, as already anticipated:  overoptimism, 
overconfidence, and the illusion of control.33 
                                                 
30 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology:  A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and 
Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 761 (2000). 
31 Id. 
32 See id. at 757 (“[B]ecause people and institutions can adapt to their cognitive 
limitations, a clear rule of enforcing liquidated damages clauses could lead experienced 
parties to develop an appropriate adaptation.”) (footnote omitted). 
33 See generally Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks, 246 SCIENCE 1232 
(1989) [hereinafter Weinstein, Optimistic Biases]; Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism 
About Susceptibility to Health Problems:  Conclusions from a Community-Wide Sample, 5 J. 
BEHAVIORAL MED. 481 (1987); Neil D . Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life 
Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980).  In these works, Neil Weinstein 
gives some particularly important data on overoptimism with regard to personal safety.  
In general, an individual will consider herself less at risk than others.  However, 
Weinstein also highlights the fact that “[o]ptimis[m] biases also appear for positive events:  
people regard themselves as more likely than others to experience financial success, career 
advancement, and long life.”  Weinstein, Optimistic Biases, supra, at 1232. Weinsten states, 
“In general, optimism is greatest for hazards with which subjects have little personal 
experience, for hazards rated low in probability, and for hazards judged to be 
controllable by personal action.”  Id.  The author considers experience to be a significant 
factor, a theme which is not given much emphasis in this Article, but he also attaches 
importance to forms of illusion of control, a typical characteristic of the counterparty who 
believes he has all aspects of a contract under control.  From this point of view, 
Weinstein’s work is instructive in terms of demonstrating the results which can be 
achieved in this Article.  See generally Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every 
Relationship Is Above Average:  Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of 
Marriage, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAVIOR 439 (1993) (concluding that a more accurate knowledge 
of the type of event and its consequences does not correct the bias); Arnold C. Cooper, 
Carolyn Y. Woo & William C. Dunkelberg, Entrepreneurs’ Perceived Chances for Success, 3 J. 
BUSINESS VENTURING 97, 107 (1988) (suggesting that entrepreneurs should form 
relationships with outsiders, such as board members, other business people, and 
accountants, who can provide objective assessments); Dan Lovallo & Daniel Kahneman, 
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A. Overoptimism 
Overoptimism bias is the systematic tendency for people to be overly 
optimistic about planned actions.34  More precisely, it is a tendency to 
overestimate the likelihood of good things happening regarding the 
outcome of planned actions and other events.35  A random study of New 
Jersey adults showed a high overoptimsm regarding personal risks.36  In 
general, optimism is greatest for hazards judged to be controllable by 
personal actions.37  “A significant optimistic bias was found for 25 of 32 
hazards in this study.”38  People are unrealistically optimistic in relation 
to many aspects of their lives.39  The majority of people “believe that 
their own risk of a negative outcome is far lower than the average 
person’s.”40    
Its relevance here is patent.  If decision makers are unrealistically 
optimistic, they will systematically underestimate risks so that they will 
not understand the exact probability they face to pay damages stated by 
the penalty clause.41 If the parties to an agreement underestimate the risk 
of breach, then they assign it too low a value and are prone (if we 
                                                                                                             
Delusions of Success:  How Optimism Undermines Executives’ Decisions, HARV. BUS. REV., July 
2003, at 56, 58 (recommending that adopting an outside view in place of traditional 
forecasting processes provides a reality check, thereby reducing the odds that “a company 
will rush blindly into a disastrous investment of money and time”) ;  Ola Svenson, Are We 
All Less Risky and More Skillfull than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143 
(1981) (stating that ninety-three percent of drivers think they are better than average); Neil 
D. Weinstein, Why It Won’t Happen to Me:  Perceptions of Risks Factors and Susceptibility, 3 
HEALTH PSYCHOL. 431 (1984) (providing the perception that negative events will happen 
only to others). 
34 Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. 
L. REV. 1765, 1773 (1998). 
35 See Hillman, supra note 7, at 723 (explaining the tendency for people to be 
overconfident).  “Once people make a decision, they are especially likely to downplay risks 
and to become overconfident about their decisions.”  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
36 Weinstein, Optimistic Biases, supra note 33, at 1232. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 There is evidence that people underestimate their absolute as well as relative 
probability of auto accidents.  See Colin F. Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, Decision 
Processes for Low Probability Events:  Policy Implications, 8  J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 565, 
566 (1989) (“For example, motorists perceive their chances of suffering a severe accident as 
very low, even though the data show that cars are one of the leading causes of death in the 
U.S. (over 47,000 deaths in 1986).”). 
40 Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1541 (1998). 
41 Lovallo & Kahneman, supra note 33, at 58 (“When forecasting the outcomes of risky 
projects, executives all too easily fall victim to what psycholigists call the planning fallacy.  
In its grip, managers make decisions based on delusional optimism rather than on a 
rational weighting of gains, losses, and probabilities.”). 
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imagine that it is rational to introduce a supra-compensatory provision) 
to provide for too-high damages.  A link between overoptimism and 
overconfidence is represented by evidence that people usually 
underestimate low-probability risks of economic loss as well as low-
probability high-magnitude risks unless they are highly salient.42 
B. Overconfidence 
Overconfidence is another bias that consists, first of all, of the human 
tendency to be more confident in one’s behaviors, attributes, and 
physical characteristics than one ought to be.43  This definition, 
however, could create some confusion with the other self-serving bias, 
overoptimism.  In cognitive psychology, overconfidence indicates the 
tendency of subjective accuracy to consistently exceed the objective 
accuracy of prediction.44  Overconfidence bias may also cause people to 
persist in situations where their expected outcome is poor.  Moreover, 
overconfidence causes many individuals to grossly underestimate their 
odds of making a payment late.  Statistically, many people are quite 
likely to make one or more payments late due to a normal range of 
difficulties and delays in day-to-day life.45  Overconfidence has an 
important consequence when it is only possible to know the probable 
distribution of an outcome.  In this case, overconfidence determines a 
tendency to assign too low a variance to the probability distribution; if it 
is too tight to start with, one is unlikely to optimally evaluate the penalty 
clause.46 
It has been said that 
[t]he pervasive finding that subjects are overconfident 
may have important economic implications.  If people 
underestimate the width of distributions of future 
quantities, they will underinvest in flexibility and 
insurance, which might have implications for 
equilibrium models of rental and ownership of housing, 
choices of mortgage terms (adjustable vs. fixed-rate), 
                                                 
42 See Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA 
L. REV. 1193, 1245–47 (1994).  See generally Camerer & Kunreuther, supra note 39. 
43 Briony D. Pulford & Andrew M. Colman, Overconfidence, Base Rates and Outcome 
Positivity/Negativity of Predicted Events, 87 BRITISH J. PSYCHOL. 431, 431 (1996). 
44 Id. 
45 Albert Phung, Behavioral Finance:  Key Concepts—Overconfidence, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/university/behavioral_finance/behavioral9.asp (last 
visited Aug. 21, 2013). 
46 See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:  HEURISTICS AND BIASES 287 (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (discussing an examination of the results of experiments). 
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marriage and divorce rates, managerial investments in 
manufacturing flexibility, and so on.  Underestimation 
of variation might help explain why so many small 
businesses fail because of insufficient cash flow 
(stemming from overly narrow planning, perhaps).47 
C. The Illusion of Control 
The illusion of control is the tendency for individuals to believe they 
can exercise control over, or at least influence, outcomes over which they 
have no demonstrable influence.48  This is a particularly important bias 
for our analysis because parties who mistakenly believe that they can 
control events with regard to penalty clauses ultimately make the wrong 
decisions.  Literature regarding the illusion of control indicates that 
entrepreneurs, for example, view risk as a challenge to be overcome and 
choice as a commitment to a goal. 49  They imagine themselves in 
control of people and events.  Many attempts have been made to 
provide explanations for this bias, some of which view this as a positive 
adaptive characteristic of human beings.  The analysis in this Article, 
however, outlines the possible wrong decisions that can be brought 
about by this bias, but not its psychological motivation. 
The justification of one important explanation for illusion of control 
has its roots in the necessity of people to give themselves self-regulation.  
In a chaotic and unregulated world, people are driven by internal 
necessities to reassert control.50  Self-serving biases have been considered 
                                                 
47 COLIN CAMERER, Individual Decision Making, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL 
ECONOMICS 594–95 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995) (citation omitted). 
48 See Illusion of Control, SCIENCE DAILY, http://www.sciencedaily.com/articles/i/ 
illusion_of_control.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2013) (explaining illusion of control generally). 
49 See generally James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk 
Taking, 33 MGMT. SCI. 1404 (1987). 
50 ELLER J. LANGER, The Illusion of Control, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:  
HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 46, at 231. 
While most people will agree that there is much overlap between skill 
and luck, a full understanding of how inextricability bound the 
two are has to be attained.  In principle the distinction seems clear.  
In skill situations there is a causal link between behavior and 
outcome.  Thus, success in skill tasks is controllable.  Luck, on the 
other hand, is a fortuitous happening.  The issue of present concern is 
whether or not this distinction is generally recognized.  The position 
taken here is that it is not. 
Id. 
 It is conceivable that the illusion of control increases with the desirability of the 
possible result from a contract, or perhaps with the necessity to draw up a contract, 
particularly where a potential agreement is seen as essential or highly attractive.  This 
phenomenon is also recognized in the area of overoptimism:  the more desirable the 
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by many scholars as solid justification for the judicial scrutiny of penalty 
clauses. 
V.  COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND PENALTY DOCTRINES 
If we consider individuals in terms of cognitive psychology, there 
are three particular biases that are possible at the point of accepting a 
contract, which include penalty clauses:  (1) overoptimism, which leads 
the subject to believe the situation is more favorable than it really is; (2) 
overconfidence, which gives rise to excessive self-belief with regard to 
evaluating a situation, particularly concerning the likelihood of success 
(the subject has a high degree of certainty and does not consider the full 
range of probable outcomes, including those most damaging); and, (3) 
finally, the illusion of control, which leads the subject to feel that the 
situation is under control and is only influenced by his/her will, rather 
than random events.51 
These three biases would seem to justify comprehensive checking of 
penalty clauses due to the possibility of making wrongful choices.  By 
the same token, a number of other checks of contractual freedom could 
be justified, in the wider context, in any instance where a party 
voluntarily takes risks. 
Cognitive psychology, however, offers a deeper knowledge of 
cognitive limitations that can prevent a perfectly rational decision.  But 
this discipline is context-specific and rejects some kinds of 
generalizations that are peculiar to neoclassical economic thought, such 
as the familiar theory that all human beings, except the underaged and 
other minor exceptions, are competent individuals.52  Cognitive 
psychology rejects such generalizations. 
                                                                                                             
potential result, the higher the probability of success which is attributed to achieving it.  
All these elements influence the biases which can prejudice a decision relating to 
penalty clauses.  See Pulford & Colman, supra note 43, at 437 (“Another judgmental bias 
that has been reported is a tendency for probability estimates of future events to be 
unrealistically optimistic, and there is evidence that this bias varies according to whether the 
prediction is related to positive or negative events . . . .”).  Langer’s view in her work 
on the subject is particularly significant.  “In addititon . . . there is another reason for this 
lack of discrimination between controllable and uncontrollable events.  This is the fact that 
skill and chance factors are so closely associated in people’s experience.”  LANGER, supra, at 
238.  This aspect is noteworthy because the risk inherent in court cases, even if low, may 
depend on a mix of controllable and uncontrollable events and as such may give rise to an 
illusion of control.  As Langer states, “There is often a true difficulty in making the 
discrimination, since there is an element of chance in every skill situation and an element 
of skill in every chance situation.”  Id.  If the overoptimism increases with the desire to 
close the deal, it may be the case that skill elements appear to outweigh chance elements. 
51 See supra Part IV (defining and illustrating these three biases). 
52 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Pyschological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. 
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For these reasons, it would be desirable that once biases like 
overoptimism, overconfidence, and the illusion of control have been 
underlined, then some further distinctions could be traced.  It seems 
doubtful that the same biases affect naive and sophisticated consumers, 
business people, chief executive officers, and company agents alike. 
Melvin Eisenberg has introduced his own proposal for the regulation 
of penalty clauses.  According to Eisenberg, overoptimism, along with 
other cognitive deficiencies, should justify a discipline of this sort: 
If, in the breach scenario that has actually occurred, 
liquidated damages are significantly disproportional to 
real losses (that is, losses in fact, not simply legal 
damages), the provision is unenforceable unless it is 
established that the parties had a specific and well-
thought-through intention that the provision apply in a 
scenario like the one that actually occurred.53 
One supporter of the penalty doctrine is Jeffrey Rachlinski, on the 
basis of a broad generalization that contracting parties are overly 
optimistic.54  However, it is evident that these proposals tend to make 
use of broad generalizations.  At first glance, it would seem possible to 
trace an intuitive distinction between people with some experience in a 
certain activity (in the case examined in this Article—contracts with a 
penalty clause) and people without experience.  The idea that some 
biases could be eliminated with experience is very intuitive, first of all 
because the decision makers usually bear the cost of their wrong 
decisions, and for this reason they should have an incentive to change 
their behavior. 
Experience should have a strong debiasing effect.  In this context, it 
is worth noting that courts have never introduced a distinction between 
sophisticated parties, to which the penalty doctrine should not be 
applied, and naive parties, protected by this doctrine.  Courts have 
anticipated cognitive psychology results, because, contrary to intuition, 
empirical studies tell us that experience does not eliminate some biases, 
                                                                                                             
U. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (2003).  “Human choice is nuanced; subtle differences in the 
presentation format, or ‘representional structure,’ lead people to make different 
decisions.”  Id. at 1207. 
53 Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 234–35. 
54 See Rachlinski, supra note 30, at 760–63.  It is interesting to note that this author in 
some papers has underlined the tendency of cognitive psychology to avoid 
generalizations and instead to be characterized by attention to context.  See, e.g., Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 207 
(2006).  However, there may well be a problem of interpretation, since his explanation is, 
in some respects, a summary rather than a detailed treatment. 
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particularly those considered here—overoptimism, overconfidence, and 
the illusion of control.55 
More precisely, although experience can work, at least to some 
degree, it is necessary that some stringent conditions be present.  Hence, 
experiments have shown that feedback must be rapid and accurate.56  
Moreover, feedback should regard not only the mere result, but should 
be “task feedback,” that is, feedback that extends into what was 
inappropriate and what should have happened.57  With regards to 
penalty clauses, experience could have an effect because the larger the 
financial loss, the faster the learning, and in many cases penalty clauses 
determine substantial financial losses.  However, this effect is probably 
eliminated by the fact that the phenomenon of “learning by experience” 
works if experience is very frequent, whereas paying liquidated damages 
is relatively rare for most market participants.58 
This unpleasant result prevents the possibility of tracing a distinction 
between sophisticated parties and naive parties.  Using 
unconscionability doctrine terminology, if the results of cognitive 
psychology had been different, it would have been possible to construe a 
lack of sophistication as procedural unconscionability and 
unreasonableness of the liquidated damages provision as substantive 
unconscionability.59  In this way, using scientific results based on the 
typical biases of overoptimism and overconfidence, the penalty doctrine, 
such as unconsionability, could have been inserted into the traditional 
doctrines.  Furthermore, a method of alleviating the strong scrutiny 
applied to liquidated damages provisions would have been identified.  
Unfortunately, it is not possible to further develop the idea of 
distinguishing between sophisticated and unsophisticated parties. 
                                                 
55 Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts:  A Cognitive 
Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17, 24–27 (1993); see also Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin 
M. Hogarth, Confidence in Judgment:  Persistence of the Illusion of Validity, 85 PSYCHOL. REV. 
395 (1978); William Remus, Marcus O’Connor & Kenneth Griggs, Does Feedback Improve 
the Accuracy of Recurrent Judgmental Forecasts?, 66 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 22 (1996). 
56 Einhorn & Hogarth, supra note 55, at 407–15. 
57 Remus et al., supra note 55, at 23. 
58 See Garvin, supra note 25, at 389 (discussing the faulty rationale that availability of 
information will guarantee rational decision making because “information would be 
worth less in a world of systematic cognitive error than it would in a world of perfectly 
processed information”). 
59 See Hillman, supra note 7, at 738 (“[P]erhaps courts should abandon the special tests 
for agreed damages and simply apply traditional policing doctrines, such as 
unconscionability and duress.”). 
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VI.  NEW DISTINCTIONS, UNSATISFACTORY RESULTS 
While having acknowledged that the distinction between 
sophisticated and unsophisticated parties is not useful, it remains 
important to explore some of the other arguments outlined above.  
Among such arguments supporting penalty doctrine, we mentioned 
those suggesting that individuals are overly optimistic and 
overconfident and that they do not accurately evaluate the risks that they 
are taking due to a penalty clause.60  Accordingly, a legal form of 
paternalism may be warranted. 
Another group of arguments focuses on judges’ decisions and leads 
to opposite conclusions.  Specifically, courts suffer from biases, as do all 
humans, including (1) hindsight bias, (2) fair biases, and (3) framing 
effects.61  For this reason, they are not able to conduct those evaluations 
that a penalty doctrine asks of them; mistakes are the rule while correct 
evaluations are the exception.  The most efficient solution is to drop the 
penalty doctrine and the strong paternalism that inspires it and apply 
general doctrines like unconscionability or duress to all liquidated 
damages provisions.62 
This Article aims to find a third solution:  the generalization that is at 
the basis of the penalty doctrine appears too broad.  In other words, the 
same overoptimism that leads a naive consumer to a wrong choice 
would lead a group of managers with different experiences, who make a 
collective decision, to the same mistake.  This seems to be a 
counterintuitive generalization.  It is possible that some debiasing 
mechanisms exist, and, thanks to this, some decisions are not a product 
of overconfidence, overoptimism, or the illusion of control.  Evidence in 
this regard is represented by the empirical results of, for example, 
excellent calibration of some classes of people.63 
VII.  NEW BOUNDARIES:  DEBIASING THROUGH HIERARCHIES 
Cognitive psychology gives us a deeper knowledge of the human 
decision making processes.  Supporters of this discipline point out that it 
differs from neoclassical rational decision theory in its ability to avoid 
                                                 
60 See supra notes 34–47 and accompanying text. 
61 See supra Part IV (providing a detailed explanation of the three types of biases). 
62 See generally Hillman, supra note 7. 
63 See, e.g., BURTON P. FABRICAND, HORSE SENSE:  A RIGOROUS APPLICATION OF 
MATHEMATICAL METHODS TO SUCCESSFUL BETTING AT THE TRACK 34–35 (1965); see also Sarah 
Lichtenstein et al., Calibration of Probabilities: The State of the Art to 1980, in JUDGMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY:  HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 46, at 321 (discussing the results 
of demonstrating superb calibration of weather forecasters’ precipitation predictions). 
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false generalizations.  For this reason, the results that have been obtained 
with regard to penalty clauses (i.e., justifying the penalty doctrine on the 
assumption that people, generally speaking, are overconfident and 
overly optimistic) is unsatisfactory.  Indeed, it is another generalization, 
with the difference being that its content is opposed to what could be 
drawn from neoclassical rational choice theory. 
As mentioned above, in Germany two different schools of thought 
are in force with respect to penalty clauses, one found in the Civil Code 
and the other in the Commercial Code.  The Civil Code states that judges 
can reduce the penalty if it is disproportionately high.64  No such 
discretion is found in the rules in the Commercial Code:  there are no limits 
to the freedom of contract. 
It is interesting to highlight, as far as U.S. common law is concerned, 
a particular discipline that is somewhat understudied.  This is the 
discipline known as “disproportionality doctrine.”65  Consider the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351(3), which states that  “[a] court 
may limit damages for foreseeable loss by excluding recovery for loss of 
profits, by allowing recovery only for loss incurred in reliance, or 
otherwise if it concludes that in the circumstances justice so requires in 
order to avoid disproportionate compensation.”66  Comment f of this 
section states, “The limitations dealt with in this Section are more likely 
to be imposed in connection with contracts that do not arise in a 
commercial setting.”67 
Note, there is a distinction between rules destined to be applied to 
commercial players and rules intended for non-commercial players 
(consumers).  The question arises as to whether there are debiasing 
mechanisms capable of supporting such a distinction.  Individual choices 
about liquidated damage provisions can be the product of a debiased 
choice so that the common law penalty doctrine seems just as unjustified 
as civil law doctrines.  Thus, the focus will be on business organizations. 
Is it then possible to identify some debiasing procedures within the 
hierarchy, and, more generally, the mechanisms that allow an 
                                                 
64 J. Frank McKenna, Liquidated Damages and Penalty Clauses:  A Civil Law Versus Common 
Law Comparison, LEXOLOGY (May 12, 2008), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx? 
g=d413e9e1-6489-439e-82b9-246779648efb (“There is a distinction between liquidated 
damages (Schadenspauschale) and contractual penalties (Vertragsstrafe) in the German 
Civil Code, and both are allowed according to article 340 and 341 of the BGB.  The 
difference between them is that the latter can be mitigated if ‘disproportionate or 
excessively high.’”) (citation omitted). 
65 See generally Garvin, supra note 25, at 345–60 (providing the origins of 
disproportionatlity and defining its current formation as of 1998). 
66 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(3) (1981). 
67 Id. at § 351(3) cmt. f. 
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organization to work?  That is not to say that the results about experience 
must be considered conclusive.  It is possible that new studies could 
demonstrate the ability of experience to weaken some biases, such as 
overoptimism and overconfidence.  But it is quite possible that other 
factors can have the same, if not stronger, influence in leading 
individuals to make more rational decisions. 
In a typical business organization, relations among staff have a 
hierarchical form.  This means that usually a decision taken by a 
subordinate is evaluated by a senior colleague.  There is one important 
phenomenon produced by a hierarchical relationship:  the pressure of 
accountability.68  Decision makers become more risk-averse when they 
expect their choice to be reviewed by others, and they prefer to avoid 
any kind of choice that implies even a small increase in the probability of 
a disaster.69  Risk aversion is a consequence of loss aversion, and it is not 
mitigated when decisions are made in an organizational context.  As 
Kahneman and Lovallo point out,  “On the contrary, the asymmetry 
between credit and blame may enhance the asymmetry between gains 
and losses in the decision maker’s utilities.”70  As for managers, it has 
been noted in a survey that they appeared to have an excessive aversion 
to loss outcome that could in fact yield a net loss.71  Aside from this 
particular managerial tendency, which is contrasted by other behavioral 
aspects, it is important to highlight the existence of mechanisms of 
accountability for management choices.  As for corporations, executives 
are subject to the control of boards of directors, which usually includes 
non-executive directors. 
“Pressure of accountability” not only has an impact in terms of 
increasing risk aversion, but also in the form of a debiasing effect.72  
When an individual is accountable for his decisions, firstly, he cannot 
                                                 
68 See Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 259–63 (1999) (providing a complete review of research literature on 
the effects of accountability on cognitive biases). 
69 See generally W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley A. Magat & Joel Huber, An Investigation of the 
Rationality of Consumer Valuations of Multiple Health Risks, 18 RAND J. ECON. 465 (1987). 
70 Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 55, at 22. 
71 See generally Ralph O. Swalm, Utility Theory-Insights into Risk Taking, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Jan.–Feb. 1966, at 123. 
72 Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 55, at 22 ( “The evidence indicates that the 
pressures of accountability and personal responsibility increase the status quo bias 
and other manifestations of loss aversion.”).  Notwithstanding these opinions, the two 
authors conclude that decisions in a firm are generally over-optimistic.  For example, 
they state that “[p]essimism about what the organization can do is readily 
interpreted as disloyalty, and consistent bearers of bad news tend to be shunned.”  Id. 
at 28.  However, because subordinates must always answer to superiors, it is possible 
that a stronger sense of realism is necessary. 
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follow his “intuitive judgment”73—what Kahneman and Lovallo refer to 
as the “inside view of the problem.”74  The intuitive judgment cannot be 
overviewed by other staff members, and, for that reason, it cannot be a 
way of justifying a decision in a hierarchical organization.  When 
intuitive judgment is abandoned, an effort must be made to single out all 
the consequences of a decision, evaluating remote risks without 
removing them from the scenario.  This phenomenon may be called 
“personal responsibility.” 
Accountability also tends to force an “outside view of the problem,” 
because a justification of a choice based on statistical data is a more 
objective way to defend the worker’s own decision, especially when the 
manager does not have inside information about the decision.75  When 
people follow an inside view of the problem, “[t]hey . . . forecast[] by 
focusing tightly on the case at hand—considering its objective, the 
resources they brought to it, and the obstacles to its completion; 
constructing in their mind scenarios of their coming progress; and 
extrapolating current trends into the future.”76 
Instead, “[the outside view] involved no attempt at forecasting the 
events that would influence the project’s future course.  Instead, it 
examined the experience of a class of similar cases, laid out a rough 
distribution of outcomes for this reference class, and then positioned the 
current project in that distribution.”77  The outside view of the problem 
“focuses on the statistics of a class of cases chosen to be similar in 
relevant respects to the present one.”78 
It is recognized that the inside view of the problem generates overly 
optimistic opinions, so pressure of accountability not only 
counterbalances some biases because it is at the root of risk aversion, but 
it also tends to lead to debiasing decisions.79  Accountability also has an 
                                                 
73 See generally HEURISTIC AND BIASES:  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas 
Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds, 2002) (explaining generally the psychology 
of “intuitive judgment” and the remarkable amount of biases that distort it). 
74 Regarding forecasts expressed on the base of the inside view of the problem in a 
concrete case, Kahneman and Lovallo state, “Not surprisingly, the resulting forecasts, even 
the most conservatives ones, were exceedingly optimistic.”  Lovallo & Kahneman, supra 
note 33, at 61. 
75 See supra note 41. 
76 Lovallo & Kahneman, supra note 33, at 61. 
77 Id.  Since liquidated damages provisions present some peculiarity, Kahneman and 
Lovallo’s remarks are convincing.  Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 55, at 30.  “A deliberate 
effort will therefore be required to foster the optimal use of outside and inside views in 
forecasting, and the maintenance of globally consistent risk attitudes in distributed 
decision system.”  Id. 
78 Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 55, at 25. 
79 Id. at 25–27; Lovallo & Kahneman, supra note 33, at 61. 
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effect on overconfidence; some studies give the results of a decreased 
overconfidence and an improved calibration.  There is evidence of a bias 
attenuation.80  This is also true for executives when they are accountable 
to a board of directors.  The presence of non-executive directors, 
sometimes independent members who are not involved in all the steps of 
a decision, gives rise to the outside view of the problem, which is less 
biased and more accurate.81 
VIII.  WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WHEN DEBIASING MECHANISMS ARE NOT 
PRESENT? 
When a business organization takes the form of a corporation, it is 
also possible to identify some debiasing mechanisms with regard to 
managers’ decisions.  It might be possible to adopt a separate discipline 
for penalty clauses signed by agents of a corporation, because there 
should be a presumption in favor of rational choices and a decision 
based on an illusion of hope.  In this case, it should be stated that the 
main factor in debiasing decisions taken by company agents is not 
experience, but primarily mechanisms that are characteristic of a 
hierarchical organization and, as far as debiasing mechanisms regarding 
managers’ choices, peculiar to corporations. 
Not all of these conclusions are valid for individual entrepreneurs 
who own a small firm.  This is a hypothesis that presents some problems 
because the decision maker (i.e., the entrepreneur) does not make 
decisions through processes similar to those that have been identified in 
a hierarchical organization.  In this case, decisions can be biased by 
overoptimism and overconfidence.82  The inside view of the problem and 
the intuitive judgment are destined to prevail over “statistical 
evaluation” (the outside view of the problem) and a more complete 
identification of risks.83  The illusion of hope can be present even if the 
                                                 
80 See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin, Sylvia R. Castillo & Scott Rigby, The Accuracy-Confidence 
Correlation in Eyewitness Testimony:  Limits and Extensions of the Retrospective Self-Awareness 
Effect, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 698 (1991); Philip E. Tetlock & Jae Il Kim, 
Accountability and Judgment Processes in a Personality Prediction Task, 52 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 700 (1987). 
81 There is a further reason which may drive managers to be risk averse—hindsight bias 
of the board of directors.  In the event of a choice with a low probability of a negative 
outcome actually resulting in that very same negative outcome, hindsight bias drives the 
members of the board to believe that management had underestimated the probability of 
an undesired result.  This then gives rise to a tendency toward more conservative choices. 
82 See supra notes 34–47 and accompanying text (discussing the overoptimism and 
overconfidence biases). 
83 See generally  HEURISTIC AND BIASES:  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra 
note 73.  In this book, “intuitive judgment” is characterized by the presence of euristics 
and biases that can emerge if debiasing processes do not operate. 
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entrepreneur is a sophisticated businessperson.  In this way, a distinction 
made by ruling judges can be developed in a manner that does not 
precisely correspond between commercial and non-commercial players, 
but rather seeks to recognize differences within the category of 
commercial players.   
A commercial player, for example a single entrepeneur, can suffer 
from overoptimism, overconfidence, and the illusion of control.  If a firm 
is controlled by a single person and does not have a strong hierarchical 
organization, it can have the same problems that a consumer encounters.  
On the other hand, a commercial player—in which precise hierarchies 
and a board of directors are present—may have some established 
mechanisms to debiase choices.  The former case would nevertheless be 
judged as if the relevant party were a consumer, since her experience has 
no legal validity. 
As for consumers, it seems apparent that it is quite difficult to 
imagine situations in which debiasing mechanisms, such as those singled 
out above, can operate.  On the basis of our analysis, consumers can be 
overly optimistic, overconfident, and can have the illusion of control, 
and these biases are destined to distort their choices because consumers 
usually do not bear the pressure of accountability.84  In the case of 
consumers, experience is also less of an influencing factor.  Cognitive 
psychology, however, may produce new results concerning this in the 
future. 
IX.  SOME PRESCRIPTIVE SUGGESTIONS 
As argued above, cognitive psychology is a tool with which it is 
possible to avoid substituting the broad neoclassical generalization (all 
individuals are competent) with another generic classification (all people 
are overly optimistic, overconfident, and have an illusion of control).85  
In the hypothesis (e.g., in a business organization), it has been possible to 
                                                                                                             
[T]he early studies of euristics and biases displayed little interest in the 
conditions under which intuitive reasoning is pre-empted or 
overridden—controlled reasoning leading to correct answers was seen 
as a default case that needed no explaining.  A lack of concern for 
boundary conditions is typical of young research programs, which 
naturally focus on demonstrating new and unexpected effects, not on 
making them disappear. 
See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited:  Attribute Substitution 
in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTIC AND BIASES:  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, 
supra note 73, at 50. 
84 See generally Einhorn & Hogarth, supra note 55. 
85 See supra Part IV (discussing over-optimism, over-confidence, and the illusion of 
control). 
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single out mechanisms that have the quality of debiasing choices, at least 
partially, and so it is conceivable that the law could equally determine 
whether decisions are made by rational decision makers. 
In the previous analysis, it has been shown that in moving from the 
organization of a corporation to that of a small firm owned by a single 
entrepreneur, debiasing mechanisms tend to diminish or even disappear.  
The hope, however, is that in the future cognitive psychology will be 
able to help legal scholars identify more precisely all situations where a 
decision is taken through a debiasing process and conversely the cases 
where it is not. 
The proposal, from a normative perspective, is twofold.  The first 
one regards the Italian Civil Code.  According to section 1384, “The 
penalty may be reduced if . . . its amount is manifestly too high . . . .”86  
Courts and scholars hold that in order to evaluate whether the penalty is 
manifestly too high, it is necessary and sufficient to consider the amount 
of the penalty.87  Following this line of reasoning, the penalty could also 
be reduced when the clause is inserted in a contract between two large 
corporations.  The proposal is that it may be possible to evaluate whether 
a penalty is manifestly too high by scrutinizing not only the amount of 
the stipulated damages, but also the bargaining process.  In other words, 
a penalty clause could be declared manifestly high if there is some form 
of ‘bargaining naughtiness.’88  The adverb “manifestly” should also 
involve some procedural control to verify that decisions taken by the 
parties were subjected to some debiasing processes. 
The second part of the proposal regards U.S. penalty doctrine.  As 
previously discussed, some scholars propose applying the 
unconscionability doctrine to all liquidated damages clauses.  This 
clause presents some peculiarities, and the possibility of biased decisions 
is higher than in many other cases.  Consider that the first requirement of 
the penalty doctrine, which renders a clause “void” (“[t]he amount fixed 
in the provision is not a reasonable estimate of the actual loss”), 
constitutes precisely the condition for “substantive unconscionability.”89  
In this case, substantive unconscionability is predetermined.  The second 
requirement (“[a]ctual damages are not difficult to estimate”)90 should be 
dropped because it “is irrelevant [in] determining whether a liquidated 
                                                 
86 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 1384 (It.), translated in Italian Codice Civile, TRANS-LEX.ORG, 
http://www.trans-lex.org/601300 (last visited June 29, 2013) (translated by author). 
87 Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related 
Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (1993). 
88 Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 235. 
89 Id. at 225. 
90 Id. 
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damages provision is a product of the limits of cognition.”91  However, 
this form of unconscionability should not be sufficient.  “Procedural 
unconscionability” should also be necessary.  Additionally, in order to 
identify procedural unconscionability’s hypotheses, the tools of cognitive 
psychology, which we have attempted to apply in the case of 
(hierarchical) business organizations, seem necessary and valid since 
they are supported by established scientific findings and are destined to 
give more useful tools through advances in this field of research. 
X.  THE DISCIPLINE IN ITALY AND THE UNITED STATES 
A comparable discipline of cases, which recall that dictated by the 
doctrine of unconscionability, can be found in Italian law.  In fact, there 
are a number of scenarios in which the legal system demands not one, 
but both types of unconscionability.92 
The two cases that follow are typical examples from the area of 
contract voidability (cancellation).  Codice Civile article 1447 concerns 
voidability of contracts drafted under threat of danger and states that 
whosoever draws up a contract taking on oppressive obligations for the 
purposes, known by the counterparty, of saving himself or others in 
grave personal danger may be liable to contract cancellation at the 
request of the obligated party.93  As can be seen, this constitutes a case of 
bargaining naughtiness, i.e., the condition of grave personal danger 
together with a substantive naughtiness, and the oppressiveness of the 
obligation.  One condition without the other would not be sufficient.94 
The second case, contract voidability due to damages (Codice Civile 
article 1448), relates to a party who has drafted a contract out of necessity 
and is then taken advantage of by the counterparty such that damages 
are incurred equal to half the value of the goods.95  This example also 
includes a case of procedural unconscionability alongside substantive 
unconscionability.96 
                                                 
91 Id. at 235. 
92 Id. at 234.  Eisenberg prefers not to speak of unconscionability with regard to penalty 
clauses, probably because the doctrine of unconscionability covers the case of quasi-
duress and quasi-fraud, while these cases concern mistakes.  Id.  It is worth stating that 
this doctrine also covers cases of unfair surprise.  Id.  See generally Arthur Allen Leff, 
Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1966) 
(discussing quasi-duress and quasi-fraud). 
93 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 1447 (It.), translated in Italian Codice Civile, TRANS-LEX.ORG, 
http://www.trans-lex.org/601300 (last visited June 29, 2013). 
94 Id. at art. 1448. 
95 Id. 
96 Eisenberg prefers not to speak of unconscionability with reference to penalty clauses, 
probably because the doctrine of unconscionability covers the case of quasi-duress and 
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However, the discussion may be broadened by considering the 
context of contracts in which one party is a consumer.  Many of these 
contracts are governed by a discipline that is somewhat different from 
the traditional approach.  Again, this can be described as a case of 
procedural unconscionability (the fact that one party is a consumer).  The 
presence of a consumer as a party compromises the perfect functionality 
of the exchange as an expression of absolute and informed freedom. 
Admittedly, there are also scenarios in the Italian system according 
to which substantive unconscionability itself renders the contract or the 
relevant clause invalid.  This is the case, for example, in article 1229, 
which stipulates that any agreement that excludes a party from fraud or 
other grave culpability, or limits such culpability, is legally null and 
void.97  In this case, substantive unconscionability is a symptom of 
procedural unconscionability. 
As Craswell outlines with regard to American law, “[S]ome courts 
have suggested a vaguely mathematical metaphor in which a large 
amount of one type of unconscionability can make up for only a small 
amount of the other.”98 
The idea of a kind of mathematical formula, in which the greater 
part is substantive unconscionability and correspondingly the minor part 
is procedural unconscionability, may be applied to both the Italian and 
American legal systems.  This is possible if we assume that forms of 
substantive unconscionability are symptoms of underlying cases of 
procedural unconscionability and, conversely, that strong forms of 
procedural unconscionability are deservedly considered invalid to 
produce valid incentives for a party to obtain proper consent from its 
counterparty.99  It is also possible that strong forms of procedural 
unconscionability are themselves symptoms of an underlying 
substantive unconscionability. 
The formula is thus expressed in the case of Tacome Boatbuilding Co., 
Inc. v. Delta Fishing Company, Inc. by Judge James Burns.  “Of course, the 
substantive/procedural analysis is more of a sliding scale than a true 
                                                                                                             
quasi-fraud, while these cases concern mistakes. It is worth stating that this doctrine also 
covers cases of unfair surprise.  See Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 234; Leff, supra note 92. 
97 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 1229 (It.), translated in Italian Codice Civile, TRANS-LEX.ORG, 
http://www.trans-lex.org/601300 (last visited June 29, 2013). 
98 Craswell, supra note 16, at 17–18 (citing Tacoma Boatbuilding Co. v. Delta Fishing Co., 
No. 165-72C3, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17830, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 4, 1980)). 
99 Craswell, supra note 16, at 6 & fig. 1 (providing a decision tree with regard to 
determing proper consent). 
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dichotomy.  The harsher the clause, the less ‘bargaining naughtiness’ that 
is required to establish unconscionability.”100 
This is however not the case for penalty clauses.  These are invalid in 
the American system and may be reduced in the traditional continental 
systems if there is substantive unconscionability without the balancing 
formula proposed above.  Consideration must be given to the tendency 
to evaluate the fairness of a penalty clause ex post (i.e., by referring to 
the effective damages suffered compared with that foreseen in the 
penalty clause).  In such a case, even a correct evaluation of the expected 
damages ex ante would be repudiated, and the judge would enforce his 
or her own decision rather than that liberally taken by the party in 
question.101 
As far as U.S. common law, the solution could be to apply the 
doctrine of unconscionability with some peculiarity.  As we have seen, 
substantive unconscionability should be determined ex ante, while 
procedural unconscionabilibility should be affirmed in any case in which 
a debiasing mechanism is not individuated. 
This Article has sought to propose solutions for removing this 
doctrine which is so firmly rooted in American law.  An attempt has 
been made to demonstrate that mechanisms exist for debiasing decisions 
that should exclude procedural unconscionability and consequently 
render unjustified the voidness of the clause.  An explanation has been 
given of the background that has led some courts to use a type of 
mathematical formula in which strong substantive unconscionability 
requires, for the invalidity of the clause, a more moderate procedural 
unconscionability.  Conversely, a strong procedural unconscionability, 
again of the clause being invalidated, requires less robust substantive 
unconscionability. 
The mathematical formula is a new and interesting solution for these 
kind of problems.  A strong finding of procedural unconscionability 
could require, in many cases, no substantive unconscionability, and 
                                                 
100 Tacoma Boatbuilding Co. v. Delta Fishing Co., No. 165-72C3, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17830, at *20 n.20 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 4, 1980). 
101 Melvin A. Eisenberg favors an ex post evaluation of the reasonableness of penalty 
clauses, asserting, “A second-look standard for liquidated damages provisions is 
justified not because a second look may show that a provision was unconscionable, but 
because it may show that the provision was in all likelihood the product of defective 
cognition.”  Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 234.  However, it is difficult to imagine that in 
every case where the predicted ex ante damages differ from the actual loss, this is due 
to defective cognition.  In predicting the damages ex ante, the parties formulate an 
idea of plausible future damages and it is then possible that the true outcome is less 
fortunate, albeit improbable, for the party in question. 
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strong substantive unconscionability is typically a symptom of 
procedural unconscionability. 
XI.  CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This Article has made use of cognitive psychology for an objective 
directly opposed to the normal purpose of this branch of behavioral 
science.  In fact, cognitive psychology offers arguments for those scholars 
seeking to introduce moderate forms of paternalism; in some cases, it 
serves as a tool and is therefore espoused by some authors who hold 
views ideologically opposed to the concept of full contractual freedom of 
the individual.102 
However, in studying penalty clauses, I have used cognitive 
psychology in an attempt to broaden contractual autonomy.  Therefore, 
faced with a doctrine that consistently declares a certain clause invalid 
(or, in the case of continental legal systems, reduces the penalty), 
cognitive psychology may be used to identify hypotheses regarding the 
robustness of the clause.  This Article has sought to draw on cognitive 
psychological tools to identify cases in which placing such limitations on 
contractual freedom does not appear justified.  The result of this analysis 
contrasts strongly with both the attitude of American courts and the 
tendencies of Western legislative bodies.  The distinction that has come 
to light is not between commercial parties and consumers, nor between 
professionals and consumers, but instead is generally between 
sophisticated and non-sophisticated parties, or repeated and non-
repeated players.  Such distinctions, however, do not appear particularly 
useful for pinpointing hypotheses in which penalty clauses can be 
considered valid independently from their content.  To this end, a 
distinction has been introduced between parties with a hierarchical 
organization and those not organized in this fashion.  Therefore, 
particular attention has been given to the pressure of accountability and 
the outside view of the problem, two phenomena which, in my opinion, 
are able to provide a more thorough evaluation of the costs and benefits 
of contracts containing contractual clauses. 
Pressure of accountability favors judgments not affected by 
overoptimism, overconfidence, and the illusion of control, since whoever 
puts them forward may be called to answer for his or her decisions or 
may be subject to remedial penalties.  This means that all aspects of a 
decision must be carefully evaluated, and the party must have a clear 
picture of the factors that could be called into question. 
                                                 
102 See Rachlinski, supra note 54, at 1177–82 (discussing freedom of contract). 
Baffi: Efficient Penalty Causes with Debiasing:  Lessons from Cognitive
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
1016 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
The outside view of the problem, although still a generic concept, 
suggests the idea of an assessment carried out by using information from 
previous cases to determine the likelihood of outcomes in the case in 
question.  This enables overconfidence and overoptimism, along with 
individuals’ illusion of control, to be kept in check. 
It remains to be established when these phenomena operate.  In fact, 
it is not easy to determine whether a party has made a decision from an 
assessment based on the outside view of the problem or by adapting to 
the inside view of the problem of his/her superior.  Perhaps it is 
necessary to carry out evaluations on a case-by-case basis, even though 
this gives rise to grave uncertainty.  However, there is an equally grave 
uncertainty in the continental systems that allow a judge to reduce 
penalties to a level considered equitable.  The same is true for personal 
responsibility, because the subordinate could adapt his/her judgment to 
the inside view of the senior. 
The intention of this Article has essentially been to move away from 
the system of approval used by large companies for contract clauses in 
which individuals prepare an agreement, managers assess the document, 
others approve it, and finally the members of the organization who will 
work with the contract take it on-board.  This chain of command seems 
to me to be sufficient to generate debiasing mechanisms which are able 
to put single clauses beyond question. 
As has been seen, the same cannot be said for smaller individual 
entrepreneurs who make business decisions on their own behalf.  In this 
case, the above debiasing mechanisms are not in operation and clauses 
must be evaluated on their own merits. 
It is evident that in this Article the distinctions between commercial 
and non-commercial players and sophisticated and non-sophisticated 
parties have been  abandoned.  Rather, the key aspects concern the 
process of the formation of a willingness to enter into a contract, 
analyzing the presence or otherwise of debiasing mechanisms. 
As stated previously, this analysis is not considered exhaustive.  
Other debiasing mechanisms may exist, for example, for consumers, 
which have not been at all studied.  Neither have the debiasing effects 
been considered for certain external agents of companies, such as 
lawyers and consultants.  Instead, the starting point has been the 
observation from experimental economics, which states that only certain 
conditions that typically exist solely in the laboratory are able to correct 
the effects of individuals’ overoptimism and overconfidence.  The 
experience of the parties is not such a powerful debiasing tool. 
This result conflicts with the commonly held view that the parties 
with the most experience require the least protection; conversely, the 
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view that parties with less experience require greater protection can be 
countered by considering that if debiasing mechanisms are in operation, 
the unquestionable nature of decisions can be supported. 
As far as areas of future research, this work is incomplete.  It remains 
to be understood, for example, how many levels of hierarchy are 
necessary in order to debias a decision, and, to give another example, 
when it is possible to affirm that an outside view of the problem is 
properly followed. 
There are many other interesting areas to investigate.  It is possible 
to find mechanisms of debiasing in other situations, for instance, when 
one party is a consumer.  Also, a low probability, high magnitude risk 
would not create as many problems if it were highly salient and the 
party were to face it frequently.  Law and cognitive psychology give us 
the ability to reinterpret contract law in a way to obtain successes and 
not only failures.103 
                                                 
103 See generally Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades:  
Success of Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829 (2002) (documenting the failures of contract law and 
offering explanations for these failures). 
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